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I investigate? the informational role of top executive social networks by examining 
the association between top executive network centrality and corporate reporting choices. 
More centrally positioned executives might derive power from being well connected and 
thus be less concerned about the ex post penalties from the managerial labor market upon the 
revelation of financial misreporting. Using social network centrality measures constructed 
on executive biographic information, I find that chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief 
financial officers (CFOs) that are more centrally positioned in a network are generally more 
likely to engage in financial misreporting than other CEOs and CFOs. The results also reveal 
that the influence of CFO network centrality dominates that of CEOs in financial 
misreporting. Additional tests show that standard corporate governance can - at best - 
partially mitigate the financial misreporting associated with well-connected executives. I 
also examine CEO and CFO labor market consequences as a channel that links executive 
network centrality and the related corporate reporting. I find that well-connected CFOs are 
more likely to leave their current firms when financial misreporting is revealed and that their 
subsequent reemployment rate is higher than their less-connected peers. My findings suggest 
that there could be circumstances under which CFOs are more related to corporate 
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Managers have incentives to misrepresent their firms’ financial reporting.1 However, 
managers’ responses to these incentives are conditional on the expected costs and benefits of 
making a decision to misreport. Other than criminal litigation, Desai et al. (2006) and 
Collins et al. (2009) suggest that potential job market penalties are perhaps the greatest 
personal cost borne by managers when financial misreporting is revealed. Even so, studies in 
economics and sociology have long recognized the important role social networks play in 
enhancing labor market outcomes (Jackson 2009). Accordingly, top executives’ personal 
social networks are also likely to play a role in their financial reporting choices as social 
networks can reduce the expected costs arising from misreporting by providing implicit 
labor market insurance. Relatively little is known about how top executives’ social networks 
contribute to their reporting choices, however. In this study, I examine the association 
between top executives’ social network positions and their corporate reporting practices. I 
begin by constructing top executives’ personal social networks using their employment and 
education background and rely on the concept of network centrality to quantify an 
executive’ social network position with respect to the entire network to which she is linked. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1  The accounting literature suggests several motivations for why managers might engage in financial 
misreporting: employee bonuses, bond covenants, stakeholder motivations, stock price motivations, and career 




Economic theory suggests that the managerial labor market would “settle up” ex 
post with managers if they bring unfavorable corporate outcomes (e.g., Fama 1980) and 
thus is likely to serve as a constraint to misreporting. However, the disciplinary 
mechanisms imposed by the managerial labor market cannot always result in a full ex post 
settling up on the part of managers (Fama 1980). Studies in labor economics and sociology 
suggest that an individual can use her personal connections as a source to disseminate job-
related information (e.g., Granovetter 1974; Montgomery 1991; Calvo-Armengol 2004) or 
to influence people to obtain favorable employment (e.g., Lin et al. 1981). In the context of 
corporate managers, there is pervasive evidence that well-connected managers (i.e., those 
managers who are more centrally positioned in a network) are less constrained by the labor 
market than other managers (e.g., Liu 2010; Beaman and Magruder 2012; Cingano and 
Rosolia 2012).  
The social science literature further suggests that social network position affects an 
individual’s beliefs and behaviors. An individual who is centrally positioned in a network 
has higher social status and is more powerful, in that she has greater access to relevant 
resources and enjoys more opportunities relative to other individuals in the network. 
Accordingly, her view of the general situation would be more favorable than others in the 
network as her situation is objectively more advantageous. This would in turn affect her 
decisions and behaviors (Ibarra 1993; Ibarra and Andrews 1993; Mizruchi and Potts 1998; 
Hanneman and Riddle 2005).2 Thus, well-connected managers might benefit from their 
central network positions and have lower ex ante risk aversion towards negative career 
concern arising from financial misreporting than other managers. Accordingly, I predict 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 Recent studies in corporate finance find that CEO network centrality plays an economically significant role 
in corporate decisions. For instance, Faleye et al. (2014) show that firms with more central CEOs invest more 
in research and development and receive more and higher quality patents. El-Khatib et al. (2014) find that 
CEOs who are centrally positioned in the social network are powerful enough to pursue any acquisition 




that more centrally positioned managers are more likely to engage in financial misreporting 
than their less centrally positioned peers. I consider both chief executive officers (CEOs) 
and chief financial officers (CFOs) in my empirical analysis, as both roles are potentially 
crucial in the corporate reporting process. 
A related research question arises as to whose network centrality matters more in 
corporate reporting choices, CEOs or CFOs. Prior studies that examine the role of 
managers in financial reporting tend to focus on CEOs alone (e.g., Francis et al. 2008; 
Khanna et al. 2005) or the executive team as a whole (e.g., Bamber et al. 2010). More 
recent studies have started to emphasize the role of CFOs and document that CFOs’ 
characteristics and incentives have substantial impacts on their firms’ financial reporting 
practices (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010; Feng et al. 2011). In this study, I consider both CEOs and 
CFOs and distinguish their specific roles in financial reporting to enrich our understanding 
of how executive network centrality influences corporate reporting policies. It is unclear ex 
ante whether the role of CEO or CFO network centrality will dominate in determining 
financial reporting choices, as CEOs and CFOs have different job responsibilities. CFO 
centrality might matter more than that of CEO, as a CFO is directly responsible for 
financial reporting. Alternatively, CEO centrality might matter more because as the 
corporate leader, a CEO could set the reporting tone from the top and dominate her CFO’s 
role.  
The primary construct of interest in this study is executive social network centrality 
established through individual’s professional and educational links. To construct my 
measures of centrality, I obtain executives’ biographical information (past and current 
employment and education background information) from the BoardEx database of 




managers and directors of publicly traded U.S. firms. I then use those networks to calculate 
the network centrality of each CEO (CFO) relying on standard centrality measures 
developed in social network literature. I construct two measures of centrality: Degree and 
Eigenvector. Degree centrality is the total number of executives or directors with whom an 
individual shares a common employment or education link and captures the size of an 
individual’s network. Eigenvector centrality is the weighted sum of the centrality values of 
all others to whom an individual is connected and captures the importance of the 
individual’s connections. I use three proxies for financial misreporting: accrual 
management, the tendency to meet analyst earnings benchmark, and the likelihood of 
issuing a financial report that is subsequently restated. In my main analysis, my sample 
covers 19,069 firm-year observations from 3,559 unique firms spanning from 2001 to 2012. 
I include CEO and CFO centrality separately and jointly in my empirical 
specifications to investigate the specific role of CEO and CFO centrality in corporate 
reporting. I find a positive relation between CEO (CFO) centrality and misreporting based 
on accrual management and the likelihood of meeting analyst benchmark (misreporting 
based on all the three proxies for financial misreporting). Consistent with my prediction, 
my results suggest that more centrally positioned CEOs and CFOs are more likely to 
engage in financial misreporting than other CEOs and CFOs. My results also suggest that 
the impact of CFO network centrality dominates that of CEO network centrality in 
misreporting choices. Specifically, CFO centrality is significantly and positively associated 
with all three proxies for misreporting while CEO centrality is only related to two of the 
three proxies. Moreover, even though both CEO centrality and CFO centrality are 
positively associated with accrual management and the likelihood of meeting analyst 




CEO centrality. This finding, consistent with existing evidence (e.g., Mian 2001; Geiger 
and North 2006; Jiang et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011), suggests that CFOs might be more 
influential than CEOs in financial reporting as CFOs, not CEOs, typically oversee the 
corporate reporting process. 
I also perform several additional tests. First, I consider an alternative explanation for 
my findings – evidence that well-connected managers prefer to sit on misreporting firms as 
they could enjoy the benefits of that misreporting with implicit labor market insurance. My 
analysis suggests that this alternative explanation does not explain my findings. Second, I 
consider additional controls for executive characteristics and equity incentives in my 
analysis. I continue to find a significantly positive relation between executive centrality and 
financial misreporting. Finally, I examine whether standard corporate governance, in the 
form of a high percentage of independent directors, mitigates the financial misreporting 
associated with centrally positioned executives. In general, I find that this governance 
mechanism can - at best - partially mitigate financial misreporting associated with well-
connected executives.  
In my final analysis, I examine labor market consequence as a channel through 
which the relation between executive network centrality and corporate reporting holds. 
Specifically, I consider two labor market consequences – the likelihood of executive 
turnover and the subsequent reemployment rate upon the revealing of financial 
misreporting. Focusing on a sample of firms with financial restatements, I find that well-
connected CFOs are more likely to leave their current firms when their firms experience 
financial restatements than less-connected CFOs. Moreover, in the sample of CFOs who 
leave their current employers when misreporting is revealed, the subsequent reemployment 




consistent with labor market theories that well-connected managers have more outside 
employment opportunities and more easily find alternative positions. The findings hold for 
CFOs but not CEOs. This might suggest that CFOs are the ones directly responsible for 
corporate reporting and, therefore, are more likely to be affected when their firms’ 
misreporting is detected. 
This study makes several contributions to the financial reporting literature. Its 
primary contribution is identifying the informational role of executive network centrality in 
the financial reporting process. Prior studies that examine the determinants of corporate 
reporting tend to focus on firm and/or industry characteristics, although more recent studies 
have made progress in understanding the incremental role of human factors in corporate 
reporting. In this area, some studies focus on managers’ personal inherent attributes and 
document the significant role of managers’ fixed effects (e.g., Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 
2011) and executives’ underlying characteristics (e.g., Francis et al. 2008; Schrand and 
Zechman 2012). Other studies go beyond the manager inherent attributes and examine 
human factors from a social aspect. For example, Brown (2011) and Chiu et al. (2013) 
document that accounting-related choices spread across firms through shared common 
directors, while Hwang and Kim (2012) and Khanna et al. (2015) find that the relation a 
CEO develops with others inside her boardroom influences the occurrence of financial 
fraud. My study extends the literature by characterizing the effect of one particular CEO 
(CFO) attribute - her personal social network to other executives and directors - on 
corporate reporting. The findings in my study suggest an adverse side of well-connected 
executives in financial reporting that should be considered by a variety of stakeholders. 
Second, this study explores the relation between labor market mechanisms and 




in managers’ financial reporting decisions, extant studies tend to focus on the role of capital 
market pressure and managerial compensation incentives. As Beyer et al. (2010) highlight, 
our understanding of how executives’ career concerns affect their financial reporting 
strategies is still limited. I explore this issue by considering the role of executive social 
network centrality in mitigating managerial labor market concerns.  
Finally, this study provides evidence surrounding the question of “who matters” in 
corporate financial reporting, CEOs or CFOs. Prior research either focuses on the top 
management team as a whole or CEOs alone, with a few exceptions focusing on CFOs 
alone. In this study, I consider both CEOs and CFOs to enrich our understanding of their 
specific roles in financial reporting. Also, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study that directly examines the role of CFO social networks on corporate reporting. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that CFOs are reluctant participants in financial irregularities 
(e.g., Feng et al. 2011). The evidence in this study, however, suggests that there might be 
circumstances under which CFOs are related to financial misreporting and they even 
dominate the risk from CEOs. This finding should be of interest to board members, 
shareholders, and regulators. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
background studies and motivation and Chapter 3 discusses hypothesis development. 
Chapter 4 describes the data, empirical measures, and summary statistics. Chapter 5 
describes research methods and provides main results. Chapter 6 discusses future work and 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
2.1 Social Network Literature 
Social networks consist of a series of individuals and the links between those 
individuals that are formed through various social relationships. In this study, I define the 
social networks of corporate executives, where the individuals might have worked together 
or served together on the board of directors of another firm, have attended the same 
educational institutions, or have interacted on a more social level (e.g., served the same 
social charity/club or been members of the same golf club).  
Social context (captured through social networks) as an important determinant of 
economic behaviors recently has received increased attention by economists. This interest 
stems from the realization that many economic behaviors are embedded in the networks of 
relationships and, thus, the structure of those networks play an important role in governing 
the outcomes of those economics behaviors (Jackson 2009). Recent studies in corporate 
finance capture an executive’s or an institution’s social connections and have identified 
both positive and negative consequences of these social connections. The results from some 
studies support the argument that social connections facilitate accessibility to information 
and relevant resources (Lin 1999). For instance, Cohen et al. (2008) find that mutual fund 
managers connected with corporate board members invest in better performing mutual fund 




higher stock returns and experience higher future performance growth; Fracassi (2014) 
shows that firms with more central boards of directors make better investment decisions 
and experience better economic performance; and Faleye et al. (2014) provide evidence 
that firms with more central CEOs invest more in innovation and receive higher quality 
patents. Those results suggest that firms with well-connected boards or managers gain 
better access to information and resources and make more informed decisions.  
In contrast, the findings from other studies support negative consequences of 
socially connected boards or managers. For example, Bizjak et al. (2009) document that 
cross-firm board networks (interlocking boards) might prompt the spread of value-
decreasing management practices in the form of option backdating. Hwang and Kim (2009) 
find that social ties between directors and their CEOs significantly weaken directors’ 
monitoring and disciplinary effectiveness. Fracassi and Tate (2012) document that powerful 
CEOs, who are more likely to appoint directors with ties to them, weaken board monitoring 
and destroy firm values. In addition, El-Khatib et al. (2014) find that CEOs centrally 
positioned in a network become powerful enough to pursue any acquisitions, regardless of 
the potentially negative impact on shareholders. Those studies demonstrate the adverse 
consequences of social network connections in terms of corporate monitoring and 
information transfer. My study expands this stream of research that identifies dark side of 
well-connected corporate leaders by examining the association between executive 
connectedness and financial misreporting. 
 
2.2 Studies in Determinants of Corporate Reporting 
Managers know more about their firms’ performance than capital providers and 




Financial reporting plays an important role in reducing this information asymmetry. Capital 
providers not only rely on accounting information to evaluate a firm’s return potential and 
make investment decisions, but also use accounting information to monitor the use of their 
committed capital (Beyer et al. 2010). Managers have incentives to misreport their 
information, however. For example, managers have incentives to inflate earnings to 
influence stock prices for contracting purpose, to meet market expectations, or to signal to 
other stakeholders. Numerous studies in accounting have examined firm-level (e.g., Klein 
2002) or economy-level (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006) factors that 
influence the corporate reporting decisions made by managers. More recently, the 
incremental role of individual human factors in corporate reporting choices is beginning to 
attract interest among researchers. In a recent survey paper, Dichev et al. (2013), the 
authors survey 170 CFOs about determinants of financial reporting quality and report that a 
CFO suggests academics should 
 … Start with the top management or senior executives. That sets the tone or culture 
which your internal accounting function will operate under… conduct an intensive 
fundamental analysis of the backgrounds of the top people running the company 
…look at the experience of the people behind a lot of the numbers. (Dichev et al. 
2013, Page 29) 
 
Some more recent studies have begun to consider the role of human factors in 
corporate reporting choices. One stream of research focuses on managers’ personal inherent 
attributes and underlying characteristics. Several studies examine manager-fixed effects and 
find that top executives demographic characteristics and personal backgrounds are 
associated with their unique reporting styles and accounting choices (Bamber et al. 2010; 
Ge et al. 2011). Other studies investigate the role of managers’ underlying characteristics, 
including executive ability, overconfidence, and reputation, and document the importance 




Schrand and Zechman 2012; Demerjian et al. 2013). For example, Francis et al. (2008) find 
a negative association between CEOs’ reputation, as measured by press coverage, and their 
firms’ earnings quality. Using a sample of Internet firms, Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
document that overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias, which 
leads to a greater probability of financial restatement and an SEC enforcement action. 
Relying on a managerial ability score that the authors develop based on firm efficiency, 
Demerjian et al. (2013) find that managers their measure ranks as more able are associated 
with fewer subsequent restatements and higher earnings quality. Overall, this stream of 
studies focus on a manager’s personal inherent attributes.  
Another stream of research considers human factors from a social aspect and 
examines the influence of social networks on corporate reporting practices.  This research 
recognizes that managers do not exist in isolation and views them as being embedded in 
social relations and the resulting social networks. Social influence theories suggest that 
individuals’ communication and interactions influence their beliefs and behaviors (e.g., 
Burt 1987). Thus, social networks are expected to influence corporate reporting practices as 
well. Relying on this, several papers examine the contagion effect of social networks on 
corporate reporting-related decisions. Those studies focus on the contagion effects via 
interlocking boards and have documented evidence consistent with their expectations. For 
instance, Brown (2011) finds that network ties via board directorships increase the 
likelihood of adopting aggressive corporate tax reporting policy. Chiu et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that a firm that shares a common director with another firm that is an earnings 
manipulator is more likely to manage earnings while sharing a director with non-
manipulator reduces the likelihood of earnings management.  




board networks on corporate reporting practices, three recent studies examine the 
connections a CEO develops with others within her firm’s boardroom. Chidambaran et al. 
(2012) examine how firm-level CEO-board connections are related to the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. The authors find that the connection between a firm’s CEO and its 
directors built through shared employment experience lowers the incidence of fraud. The 
authors go on to argue that the personal connection facilitates board communication and 
monitoring. The findings in Chidambaran et al. (2012) support positive reporting outcomes 
of the relation that a CEO develops with others within her firm. In contrast, the other two 
studies document negative reporting outcomes of the relation that a CEO develops with 
others. Specifically, Hwang and Kim (2012) examine informal social ties between a firm’s 
CEO and its auditor committee members based on their university alumni, military service, 
academic discipline, and regional origin. They find that these social ties weaken auditor 
committee’s monitoring effectiveness and facilitate earnings management. Moreover, 
Khanna et al. (2015) study how the connections a firm’s CEO develops with its other 
executives and directors through her appointment decisions are related to corporate fraud 
occurrence and detection. They document that the loyalty of the CEO-appointed executives 
and directors to the CEO helps to conceal fraud, reduces the likelihood of CEO dismissal, 
and lowers the coordination costs of conducting illegal behaviors.  
Overall, the above three studies suggest that CEOs’ within-firm social connections 
influence their financial reporting decisions and that the influences might be positive or 
negative, depending on how the relation is developed - through shared employment 
experience or through hiring decisions. However, no study has directly examined whether 
and how top executives’ overall social network with other corporate leaders, specifically 




corporate financial reporting practices. That motivates this study. This study further 
distinguishes from prior studies in that I consider not only CEOs but also CFOs because 
CFOs are directly responsible for financial reporting and might be more influential than 
CEOs in corporate reporting choices (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010).  
 
2.3 Studies in Managerial Labor Market and  
Corporate Choices 
 The managerial labor market disciplines corporate managers based on their ability 
to bring favorable corporate outcomes (Fama 1980). Prior literature has largely focused on 
the determinants of CEO turnover and documented performance measures (e.g., Murphy 
and Zimmerman 1993) and governance structures (e.g., Yermack 1996). Recent accounting 
studies show that the managerial labor market disciplines managers based on their ability to 
anticipate and adjust to future business change as reflected in management forecast 
accuracy (Lee et al. 2012). Moreover, accounting studies provide evidence that corporate 
reporting outcomes not only serve as an important factor in determining top executive 
turnover but also influence terminated executives’ subsequent reemployment. For instance, 
Desai et al. (2006) find that corporate boards fire at least some of the top managers 
(President, CEO, and Chairman) of firms that manipulate and subsequently restate earnings. 
Further, they find that it is difficult for the terminated managers to find comparable jobs. 
Similarly, Collins et al. (2009) trace involuntary CFO turnover following earnings 
restatements. They find that, relative to a control group of non-restating forms, firms 
restating earnings downward have significantly higher CFO turnover. They also find that 
former CFOs of restatement firms are less likely to find alternatives positions in publicly 




My paper asks a follow-up question: among those managers of firms that restate 
financial statements, do well-connected managers have better employment prospects than 
those less-connected ones? My interest to examine this follow-up question is motivated by 
two streams of literature. First, labor economics studies suggest that well-connected 
individuals can use their social connections to enhance their labor market outcomes (e.g., 
Granovetter 1974; Lin et al. 1981; Montgomery 1991; Calvo-Armengol 2004; Liu 2010; 
Beaman and Magruder 2012). Therefore, well-connected managers have less to lose 
because their social connections provide implicit labor market insurance. Second, prior 
studies examining managerial labor market consequences show that managerial labor 
market penalties are concentrated in less entrenched CEOs (e.g., Lee et al. 2012). Social 
network centrality can be viewed as a power and status and therefore, more central 
managers can use their power to insulate themselves from the labor market penalties. 
Collectively, findings from those two streams of studies suggest that, although managers of 
restatement firms in general face stiff future employment prospects, the employment 
outcomes vary with the level of executive network connectedness. In contrast, a recent 
study by Peters and Wagner (2014) shows that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile 
industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. Based on the evidence provided in the 
paper, the authors suggest that an entrenchment model that suggests more powerful CEOs 
have lower job risk is incorrect.  
My study adds to the literature that examines the role of managerial labor market 
concerns in corporate reporting choices by exploring the relation between executive 
centrality and subsequent employment prospects. This study also relates to prior studies 
that explore whether managers who exit their current employers can find alternative jobs. 




negotiate large cash payments in mergers and acquisitions and exit the acquiring firms at 
the times of acquisitions. The authors find that the majority of target CEOs who exit the 
acquiring firms do not obtain further employment and the authors go on to argue that a 
large number of them probably retire voluntarily due to their multimillion dollar gains from 






3.1 Executive Centrality and Corporate Reporting 
In this study, I examine the role of managers’ overall social connectedness within a 
network consisting of business leaders in corporate reporting choices. I use the concept of 
network centrality to measure a manager’s network position and to capture her power 
derived from her social connections. 
I predict that more central managers are increasingly likely to engage in financial 
misreporting than less central managers. First? agency theory suggests that managers’ 
incentives are imperfectly aligned with those of capital providers, such that corporate 
executives have incentives to engage in misreporting due to capital market pressure, 
reputation concerns, and equity incentives. Well-connected managers might have more 
incentives to engage in misreporting than less-connected managers, however. For instance, 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that “superstar” CEOs (those who win prestigious 
national awards initiated by the business media) spend more time on distracting activities 
and find it increasingly difficult to meet market expectations. Thus, these CEOs are more 
likely to manipulate earnings to maintain their image as high performers. Similarly, well-
connected managers might devote more time to public and private activities outside their 




influential status. 3 
Second, well-connected managers have the ability to engage in accounting 
misreporting than less connected managers. Network centrality is viewed as a source of 
power and status. Individuals who are centrally positioned in the network have higher 
social status and are less constrained than others (e.g., Mizruchi and Potts 1998). 
Accordingly, the internal governance mechanisms might be less effective for central 
managers as the monitoring role of the board and the rest of the executive team diminishes 
with top executive’s power (e.g., Adams et al. 2005).  
Third and more importantly, managers’ personal connections might reduce their ex 
post risk of engaging in financial misreporting. Managers weigh the expected costs and 
benefits in making financial reporting decisions. Fama (1980) predicts that the managerial 
labor market disciplines executives according to their estimated ability to bring favorable 
corporation outcomes and, thus, serves as a constraint to misreporting.4 Empirical evidence 
is consistent with the labor market penalizing managers in cases of revealed misreporting. 
For example, Desai et al. (2006) and Collins et al. (2012) find that firms that restate their 
earnings experience greater top manager turnover and that the subsequent employment 
prospects of those displaced managers are poorer than displaced managers from non-
restating firms. Similarly, Karpoff et al. (2008) show that 93% of individuals identified as 
responsible parties for enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation lose their jobs 
by the end of the regulatory enforcement period.  
The revision process on the manager’s estimated ability imposed by the managerial 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3?Several other studies show that powerful and influential executives are more likely to engage in financial 
misreporting. For example, Francis et al. (2008) find a negative association between CEOs’ reputation, as 
measured by press coverage, and their firms’ earnings quality. Badolato et al. (2014) find that managers are 
constrained by their firm’s audit committee only when the audit committee has both financial expertise and a 
higher status relative to the managers’ status.?




labor market cannot always result in a full ex post settling up on the part of the manager 
(Fama 1980), however. Theoretically, a well-connected manager can use her personal 
network as a critical conduit in disseminating job-related information (e.g., Calvo-
Armengol 2004) and/or to obtain favorable employment. Granovetter (1974) suggests that 
“it’s not what you know but who you know” in job seeking and Montgomery (1991) argues 
that the most effective means of finding a job is through personal connections. Lin et al. 
(1981) show that an individual possesses a substantial advantage in the occupational 
attainment process if she has access to and uses resources from her social ties. More recent 
studies show further evidence that well-connected individuals are less likely to be 
disciplined by the labor market. For example, Liu (2010) provides evidence that well-
connected managers are less likely to be disciplined by the managerial labor market and are 
likely to be quickly reemployed without decline in compensation. Cingano and Rosolia 
(2012) find that displaced workers’ unemployment duration decreases significantly with 
their personal network connections with former fellow workers. Using a laboratory 
experiment, Beaman and Magruder (2012) find that social networks select individuals for 
jobs and even provide incentives to refer less-qualified individuals. Therefore, for a well-
connected manager, her gain from misconduct might outweigh the anticipated labor market 
penalties because she can utilize the influence gained from her personal networks to 
mitigate the ex post labor market penalties. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between top executive network centrality and the 
firm’s occurrence of financial misreporting.   
 
It is worth noting that it is possible that well-connected managers could instead be 
less likely to engage in financial misreporting. Career concerns are a primary incentive for 
managers to engage in financial misreporting (Graham et al. 2005). According to Graham 




meet the market expectation is seen as a “managerial failure” and would inhibit their 
upward or intra-industry mobility because these managers are seen as either incompetent 
executives or poor performance forecasters. Socially connected managers, however, are 
less constrained by the labor market. Therefore, a well-connected manager might have a 
reduced incentive to engage in accounting misreporting than her less-connected peers, since 
she has fewer career concerns. Moreover, to the extent a well-connected manager cares 
about her financial reporting reputation since more individuals in a network consisting of 
corporate leaders know her, she might be less likely to engage in financial misreporting.  
 
3.2 Whose Network Centrality Matters More 
I consider both CEOs and CFOs in this study, as both types of executives are likely 
to play important roles in corporate reporting process. Given the prediction of a positive 
relation between executive network centrality and the firm’s occurrence of misreporting, a 
related question is whose network centrality matters more in corporate reporting choices, 
CEOs or CFOs. While I compare the association between CEO centrality/CFO centrality 
and corporate reporting choices, I do not provide specific hypotheses related to this 
research question. On the one hand, CEO centrality might matter more because a CEO 
could set the tone of financial reporting from the top and dominate her CFO’s role. For 
example, Feng et al. (2011) show that CFOs are involved in material accounting 
manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek 
personal benefits from their own compensation incentives. On the other hand, CFO 
centrality might matter more than CEO centrality since the CFO is more directly 
responsible for financial reporting process than the CEO is. A few studies have examined 




For example, Geiger and North (2006) show that discretionary accruals decrease 
significantly following the appointment of a new CFO and that concurrent CEO 
appointments do not drive this decrease. Jiang et al. (2010) examine the role of executive 
equity incentives on financial reporting and find that the accrual management and the 
likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to 
those of the CEO. In addition, Ge et al. (2011) show that CFO-specific factors are 
statistically significant determinants of accounting choices, even after controlling for CEO 
style. Finally, it is also possible that CEO centrality and CFO centrality are equally 
important if corporate reporting choice is a decision made by a CEO and her CFO as a 
team. Therefore, it remains an empirical question whether CEO centrality or CFO centrality 
matters more in corporate reporting choices. 
 
3.3 Executive Centrality and Labor Market Consequences 
My next research question considers one possible mechanism through which top 
executive network centrality links to corporate reporting. Prior studies show that firms that 
restate their earnings experience greater top manager turnover and that the subsequent 
reemployment prospects of those displaced managers are poorer than displaced managers 
from non-restating firms (Desai et al. 2006; Collins et al. 2012). I expect the level of 
penalties from the managerial labor market to vary with the level of managers’ 
connectedness, however. One principal benefit of personal social networks is to enhance 
the labor market outcomes. Therefore, well-connected managers might be less likely to be 
punished by the managerial labor market because their personal connections enhance their 




serve as a link between executive network centrality and corporate misreporting.5 
I start by considering whether CEO and CFO turnover varies with the level of their 
social connectedness when financial misreporting is detected. When corporate wrongdoings 
are revealed, the penalties to responsible executives could range from reputation loss and 
displacement to criminal penalties. The turnover for well-connected CEOs and CFOs can 
be either higher or lower than their less-connected peers upon the revealing of financial 
misreporting, however. It is possible that well-connected CEOs and CFOs experience fewer 
turnovers because executive turnover is a firm-level decision and well-connected 
executives could utilize their power and influence to limit the board’s ability to fire them. It 
is also possible that well-connected CEOs and CFOs experience higher turnover since they 
have more outside opportunities than less-connected others and are more likely to leave the 
restating firm voluntarily when their reputation is damaged. Consequently, the subsequent 
turnover rate upon the revealing of financial misreporting can be either higher or lower for 
well-connected CEOs and CFOs relative to their less-connected peers. Therefore, although 
I examine whether CEO and CFO turnover varies with network centrality, I do not provide 
specific hypotheses related to this question. 
I next directly examine the reemployment outcomes for CEOs and CFOs who leave 
their current employers when the misreporting is detected. Studies in labor economics 
suggest that well-connected managers could use their social connections to transmit job-
related information (i.e., an individual asks social connections about firms that are hiring 
managers) and/or obtain favorable employment outcomes (i.e., friends use their power to 
help an individual to obtain favorable employment outcome). Prior studies also show that 
social networks select individuals for jobs and even provide incentives to refer less 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5?I do not claim that labor market consequences are the only mechanism that links executive network 




qualified individuals (e.g., Beaman and Magruder 2012). Therefore, I expect that well-
connected CEOs and CFOs are more likely to find alternative positions relative to their 
less-connected peers when they leave their current firms. Accordingly, my second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Upon revealing of financial misreporting and departure of the current 
employers, more centrally positioned executives are more likely to find alternative 





DATA, EMPIRICAL MEASURES, 
AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
4.1 Data 
In this study, I focus on CEOs and CFOs from publicly traded U.S. firms. I obtain 
CEOs and CFOs biographical information from the BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostics Ltd. My sample period starts from the year of 2001 because the data coverage 
of U.S. firms is very limited in BoardEx prior to that time (e.g., Fracassi and Tate 2012; 
Engelberg et al. 2013). The steps to link BoardEx data and other databases are similar to 
those in prior studies. I use several approaches to merge BoardEx data with 
CRSP/Compustat data to get PERMNOs and GVKEYs: for companies with an ISIN in 
BoardEx, I merge BoardEx data with CRSP/Compustat data using the CUSIP; for 
companies without an ISIN in BoardEx, I match the company name in BoardEx with the 
most recent company name in CRSP. For each firm with a valid GVKEY and PERMNO, I 
identify the firm’s CEO and CFO during a fiscal year based on executive employment 
information provided in BoardEx. Specifically, I identify CEOs following BoardEx’s role 
description (ROLE=CEO). I identify CFOs based on executive role description in BoardEx 
that includes any of the following phrases: CFO, chief financial officer, accounting, 
principal financial officer, and VP-finance. ?




employment, past employment, education background, and other social activities from a 
variety of sources, including SEC filings, corporate press releases, company websites, and 
media press. I rely on the information on employment and education to build executive 
social networks in my main analysis. I do not account for social connections established via 
social clubs, charities, or other organizations because BoardEx does not provide the starting 
date of these social activities for the majority of observations. Accordingly, inclusion of 
these social connections would lead to a significant loss of observations. BoardEx does not 
provide unique educational degree type. Instead, it lists a description of an individual’s 
“qualification”.  Employing a similar approach as in Cohen et al. (2008), I manually code 
all degree descriptions into one of six board categories: PhDs, general masters, bachelors, 
MBAs, the medical school, and the law school.  
I obtain firm-level financial accounting information from Compustat, stock-return 
information from CRSP, and analyst forecast information from I/B/E/S. Financial 
restatement data are obtained from Audit Analytics. I also include executive characteristics 
(i.e., age and gender) and executive equity incentives for a reduced sample and obtain the 
data from BoardEx.?
?
4.2. Empirical Measures 
4.2.1 Network Centrality 
To construct a manager’s social network, I exclude the manager’s connections 
within her current firm that I am measuring financial reporting. Existing research has 
already documented the role of within-firm connection between a CEO and her executives 
or board members in financial reporting (e.g., Chidambaran et al. 2012; Hwang and Kim 




connected to more people, including the connections within and outside of their current 
firms, then my results could simply capture the effects documented by the existing studies. 
I define two managers as socially connected if they are linked through at least one of the 
following connections: 
- Current employment connection: two individuals work for the same company as 
outside board directors. 
- Past employment connection: two individuals have worked for the same 
company in the top executive team or on the board in the past. 
- Education connection: two individuals have attended the same school and 
graduated within one year of each other with the same type of degree.  
The position of each individual in the entire network to which she is linked is not 
random (Jackson and Rogers 2007). The social science literature uses the concept of 
network centrality to quantify an individual’s overall connectedness and capture her 
position with respect to the network to which she is connected. Although centrality is a 
multidimensional concept, its essence is the extent to which an individual is connected to 
others in the network (Mizruchi and Potts 1998). The social network literature has 
developed several measures of centrality to capture an individual’s structural importance in 
a network. In this study, I employ Degree centrality and Eigenvector centrality as my 
empirical measures of network position.6 Degree centrality measures the number of direct 
connections an individual has and is the most commonly used centrality measure. An 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 There are four standard network centrality measures: Degree, Betweenness, Closeness, and Eigenvector 
(Bonacich 1972; Freeman 1979). Each centrality measure captures related but distinct notions of well-
connectedness. Betweenness centrality captures how frequently an individual serves as the “bridge” between 
others and possesses a more critical communication position. It accounts for an individual’s ability to restrict 
the communication of others, which is not the focus of this study. Closeness centrality measures how close an 
individual is connected to another. The communication between two individuals is more efficient with a 
shorter path between them. Eigenvector centrality assesses whether an individual’s direct contacts are also 
well connected, which relates to the notion of Closeness while overcoming the shortcomings of Closeness 





individual directly linked to more individuals, relative to others in the network, is viewed as 
more centrally positioned. Such an individual has greater opportunities and fewer 
constraints, which makes the individual less dependent on any specific others in the 
network, and hence more influential and powerful. One limitation of Degree measure is 
that it only takes into account an executive’s direct connections, which implicitly assumes 
each connection is equally important. However, a friend’s friends can be important in the 
social network as well. An individual’s centrality is a function of the centrality of those to 
whom she is connected. Therefore, I employ an alternative centrality measure, Eigenvector 
centrality, which is widely used in the network literature to measure the prestige of an 
individual. Eigenvector centrality not only takes into account the number of direct links an 
individual has but also captures the “quality” of each link. According to Eigenvector 
centrality, an individual’s centrality is the sum of the weighted values of all others to whom 
this individual is directly connected, with the weights being the importance of each linked 
person. Figure 4.1 presents an example of social network, and an illustration of Degree and 
Eigenvector centrality. 
To calculate my centrality measures, I build an annual network for each fiscal year 
during my sample period running from 2001 to 2012 based on all executives and directors 
from publicly traded U.S. firms with biographical information available in BoardEx 
database.7 I calculate Degree centrality and Eigenvector centrality for each individual in the 
network and then select annual measures of centrality for each CEO and CFO during my 
sample period. I require a firm-year observation to have both CEO network centrality and 
CFO network centrality available to be included in my sample in order to distinguish the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7?I construct a CEO’s (CFO’s) social connections by considering all executives from publicly traded U.S. 
firms in all years with information available in BoardEx database, not just executives who are CEOs or CFOs 




specific roles of CEOs and CFOs. 
 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables for H1 
I consider three measures that prior studies have used when examining financial 
reporting behaviors: (1) the absolute values of discretionary accruals; (2) meeting or just 
beating analyst forecasts; and (3) financial restatements.  
One widely-studied method by which managers are presumed to influence financial 
reporting is by managing the accrual component of earnings. Therefore, my first set of 
measures is accruals-related. I measure discretionary accruals based on the cross-sectional 
performance-matched modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). I employ this model to 
adjust discretionary accruals by performance in order to control the potential effects from 
executive personal networks on firm performance (Ge et al. 2011). I measure discretionary 
accruals as the absolute value of the residuals from the following pooled ordinary least 


















In the above regression, TAccruals is total accruals, which is the difference between 
net income and cash flow from operations; ASSET is lagged total assets; ?SALES and ?AR 
are change in sales and change in accounts receivables, respectively; PPE is net property, 
plant, and equipment; and NI is net income. Because earnings manipulations could involve 
both positive and negative values of accruals, I use the absolute value of discretionary 




Prior studies recognize that accrual-related measures are not always powerful in 
identifying earnings manipulation (e.g., Kothari et al. 2005). Therefore, I utilize a second 
measure related to meeting earnings targets, particularly consensus analyst forecasts, as 
developed in DeGeorge et al. (1999). Compared to accruals, meeting or beating consensus 
analyst forecast is an outcome-based measure commonly used as a proxy for accounting 
discretion (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010) and is viewed as a more persuasive construct of earnings 
manipulation relative to the measure based on reporting small profits (Dechow et al. 2010). 
Following Ge et al. (2011), I define MBAF as an indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
meets or beats the latest consensus analyst forecast by three cents or less, and zero 
otherwise.8 
In addition to utilizing the above two proxies as signals of opportunistic financial 
reporting behaviors, I also consider financial restatements which prior studies employ as an 
outcome-based indicator of financial misreporting. I obtain the restatement data from 
AuditAnalytics database. AuditAnalytics identifies three categories of financial 
restatements: financial frauds caused by intentional managerial manipulation; clerical 
errors caused by unintentional simple bookkeeping or calculation errors; and 
misapplication of accounting principles caused by unintentional errors in the application of 
accounting principles.9 For the purpose of this study, I include in my main analysis those 
restatements related to intentional managerial manipulation since prior study suggests that 
it is important to distinguish errors from irregularities in restatement research (Hennes et al. 
2008). Accordingly, I focus on those restatements classified under financial fraud or SEC 
investigation. I treat each firm-fiscal year as a separate observation in my analysis if a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????





restatement involves several fiscal years.10 
 
4.2.3 Dependent Variables for H2 
 To explore the labor market consequences as a link of executive centrality and 
corporate reporting choices, I consider top executive turnover upon the revealing of 
financial restatements and the subsequent employment rate of the departing executives. I 
focus on financial restatements (i.e., the restatements under financial fraud or SEC 
investigation categories in Audit Analytics) in this analysis because prior studies have 
documented that the managerial labor market penalizes executives when their firms 
experience financial restatements (e.g., Desai et al. 2006; Collins et al. 2012).  
The initial sample of this analysis contains firm-year observations experiencing 
financial restatements and with CEO and CFO centrality available. To obtain data about 
CEO (CFO) turnover, I use BoardEx data to identify a firm’s CEO and CFO at the time of 
the first filing of financial restatement and compare the CEO’s (CFO’s) name and ID 
number to those of the firm’s CEO (CFO) two years later. If they are not the same, then I 
consider the firm to have experienced a CEO and/or CFO turnover. I define CEOTurnover 
(CFOTurnover) as an indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences a CEO (CFO) 
turnover within a two-year window following the filing of a restatement, and zero 
otherwise. 11  Since my initial sample is already restricted to firms that experienced 
intentional financial restatements, I keep observations pertaining to all CEO (CFO) 
turnovers, not just those pertaining to forced turnovers. 
I next determine whether the subsequent employment status for departing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10?The results are unaffected if I consider only the first fiscal year when a firm experiences a financial 
restatement. ?
11 In the analysis of the labor market consequences, I keep only the first restatement if a firm experiences 




executives varies with their network centrality.  I focus on these managers who depart their 
current firms after their firms experience restatements and track their future labor market 
opportunities for up to four years since the current firm’s first filing of financial restatement 
within my sample period. I define CEOEmploy (CFOEmploy) as an indicator variable that 
equals one if a departing manager finds an executive position or a director position in a 
publicly traded U.S. firms  within a four-year window following the filing of a restatement, 
and zero otherwise.12  
 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analyses.13 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. Executive centrality and firm 
variables are available in 19,069 firm-year observations from 3,559 unique firms. A typical 
CEO in my sample is connected to about one hundred and eighteen other executives and 
directors and a typical CFO is connected to eighty-four other individuals through their 
employment and education experience. The value of CEO centrality measured by 
Eigenvector is higher than that of CFO centrality as well. Since these centrality measures 
are highly skewed, I use the natural logarithm of the centrality variables in the later 
analysis. The mean firm in my sample has a market value of equity of $7.17 billion and a 
median market value of $831 million. This suggests my sample includes larger firms than 
the underlying set of public firms, since the average firm in the Compustat universe during 
the same period has a mean (median) market value of equity $3.02 billion ($173 million). 
The mean book-to-market ratio in my sample is 0.57 and the median is 0.48. Panel A also 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12 I consider a four-year window following prior studies (e.g., Collins et al. 2006). The results are qualitatively 
similar if I consider departing managers’ future employment within a three-year or a five-year window. 




presents summary statistics for executive age and gender. Requiring this information 
reduces the sample size to 9,568 firm-year observations. In this sample, the average CEO is 
about fifty-five years old and the average CFO is about fifty years old. Around 3% of the 
CEOs are female while around 8% of the CFOs are female. 
In Panel B of Table 4.1, I separate the full sample into high-?DAccruals? subsample 
and low-?DAccruals? subsample based on whether a firm’s absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is higher than the median absolute value of discretionary accruals of all firm-year 
observations in my sample. I compare the mean and median values of executive network 
centrality across the two subsamples. The comparison suggests that CEOs (CFOs) in the 
high-?DAccruals? subsample have significantly higher network centrality than those in the 
low-?DAccruals? subsample. Panel C of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics after 
separating the sample into firms that meet or just beat analyst earnings target (MBAF 
subsample) and the remaining sample firms (non-MBAF subsample). Comparisons of the 
mean and median values of the two centrality measures both suggest that CEOs (CFOs) in 
the MBAF subsample have significantly higher network centrality than those in the non-
MBAF subsample. Similarly, Panel D of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics after 
separating the sample into firms that experience financial restatements and those do not. 
The results across the two centrality measures generally suggest that CEOs (CFOs) in the 
restatement subsample are more centrally positioned in the network than those in the 
remaining sample firms. 
 In Table 4.2, I present correlation metrics for the main variables. Spearman 
correlation coefficients suggest that CEO (CFO) Degree centrality is significantly and 
positively associated with CEO (CFO) Eigenvector centrality with a coefficient of 0.84 




slightly distinct dimensions of network position. The network centrality of a firm’s CEO is 
positively correlated with that of its CFO. Both CEO and CFO centrality are significantly 
and positively correlated with accrual measures, the likelihood to meet or beat earnings 
benchmark, and the likelihood of financial restatements. In addition, the correlation 
coefficients suggest that both CEO centrality and CFO centrality are positively related to 
firm size and firm age, while are negatively related to firm growth, capital expenditure, and 
return volatility. Pearson correlation coefficients suggest similar relationship as Spearman 















An Example of Social Network and Network Centrality 
 
Notes: This graph shows a simple example of social network. The nodes represent 
individuals and lines represent the links between individuals. In this social network, node 1 
and node 5 have the highest Degree centrality because each of them is directly linked to four 
others in the network. Node 5 has the highest Eigenvector centrality, because this individual 
not only directly links to more others in the network (four direct links in this example), her 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 – Executive Centrality and Reporting 
5.1.1 Main Analysis of Executive Centrality and Corporate Reporting 
5.1.1.1 Accrual Management??
I estimate the following OLS regression to test whether CEO (CFO) centrality is 
associated with accrual management. 
?
??????????? ? ?? ? ???????????????? ? ????????????????? ? ?????? ? ??????
? ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ????????? ?????????????
? ????????????????????? ? ????????????????? ? ?????????????
? ?????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
I measure accrual management as the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
derived from the modified Jones model adjusted for performance. I include returns on 
assets (ROA) to control for firm performance since prior studies show an association 
between firm performance and discretionary accruals. For example, Dechow et al. (2011) 
suggest that firms are more likely to engage in accounting manipulation when experiencing 
performance deteriorates. I include SalesGrowth to control for managerial incentives to 
inflate earnings due to the capital market pressure (Lee et al. 2006) and firm leverage ratio 
(Leverage) to control for the pressure due to debt covenants (DeFond and Jianbalvo 1994). 





(BTM), and firm age (FirmAge). I also consider controlling for firm risk in the analysis. 
Executive centrality can be viewed as a source of power and influence, which might 
increase managerial risk-taking in corporate decisions (Ibarra and Andrews 1993). This 
would in turn increase the likelihood of financial misreporting. My inclusion of capital 
expenditure and firm leverage in the analysis partially addresses the effect arising from 
risky corporate investment and debt policies. To further isolate the effect of managerial 
risk-taking on financial reporting choices, I control for the overall firm risk directly. 
Following Low (2009), I measure firm risk as the natural log of the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns during a fiscal year (RetVolatility).  
Another important factor to consider is the contagion effect of social networks as it 
might explain the variations in corporate reporting choices. Several papers examine the 
contagion effect of social networks on corporate accounting-related decisions and 
document that both good and bad accounting choices spread through social connections 
(e.g., Bizjak et al. 2009; Brown 2011; Chiu et al. 2013). To address this concern, I construct 
contagion variables to capture the reporting behaviors of a manager’s social connections. 
Specifically, during each year in my sample period, for each executive from a public U.S. 
firm in BoardEx database, I define an indicator variable that equals one if more than half of 
her social connections are from firms with the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
higher than the mean absolute value of discretionary accruals for all firms in my sample 
period. I then select the contagion variables for each CEO (CFO) in my sample and label 
them as CEOCtgDACC (CFOCtgDACC). In addition, I include year and industry fixed 
effects to control for common fluctuations in financial reporting over time and across 
industry. Finally, I cluster robust standard errors at firm level. 





and last three columns report regression results with Degree and Eigenvector as the 
centrality measure, respectively. The significantly positive coefficients on CEO centrality 
and CFO centrality in the first two columns suggest that CEO centrality and CFO centrality 
are positively associated with discretionary accruals individually. In the third column, I 
jointly include CEO and CFO centrality in the same regression to distinguish the special 
role of their social network positions. Although a firm’s CEO and CFO both have 
incentives to engage in misreporting, it is unclear who might exert more significant 
influence given their different job responsibilities in a firm and the supervisor-subordinate 
relationship between them. The coefficient estimates on both CEO and CFO centrality 
remain significantly positive in the joint analysis. The size of the coefficient on CFO 
centrality is almost double that of the CEO centrality in the regressions of discretionary 
accruals, however. I conduct a F-test to compare the equality of the coefficients on 
LogCEODegree and LogCFODegree and find that the two coefficient estimates are 
statistically different from each other (P-value<0.05). The similar results hold when I use 
Eigenvector as my centrality measure.  
I also calculate the economic significance of CEO (CFO) centrality on accrual 
management based on the regression results in the joint analysis. The results indicate that a 
one standard-deviation increase in LogCEODegree (LogCEOEigenvector) is associated 
with a 0.01 (0.008) increase in ?DAccruals?, which represents 6.25% (5%) of the mean 
?DAccruals? of 0.16. The coefficient on LogCFODegree (LogCFOEigenvector) implies that 
a one standard-deviation increase in LogCFODegree (LogCFOEigenvector) is associated 
with a 0.02 (0.015) increase in ?DAccruals?, which represents 12.5% (9.38%) of the mean 
?DAccruals? of 0.16. Those results suggest that both CEO and CFO network centrality are 





significantly greater influence on accruals management than CEO centrality in terms of 
magnitude.14  
Table 5.1 also reports that the estimated coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with findings in prior studies. For instance, accrual management is 
positively related to sales growth, and is negatively related to firm performance (e.g., Lee et 
al. 2006). Further, the coefficient estimates on the contagion variables suggest that 
managers’ accrual management is highly and positively related to their social peers’ 
reporting behaviors (e.g., Chiu et al. 2013).  
 
5.1.1.2 Meeting or just Beating Analyst Earnings Benchmark??
I estimate the logistic model below to examine whether CEO (CFO) centrality is 
related to a firm’s likelihood to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. 
 
???? ? ????????????????????? ? ????????????????? ? ?????? ? ??????
? ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ???????????? ? ???????????????????
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? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?? 
 
 
The dependent variable MBAF equals one if a firm’s actual earnings per share is 
equal to or greater than the latest analyst consensus forecast by less than three cents, as 
defined in Ge et al. (2011). In the analyses, I control for firm size (SIZE), growth (BTM, 
SalesGrowth), firm performance (ROA), the number of analysts that provide earnings 
forecasts (NumAnalyst), the dispersion of the analyst forecasts (AnalystDispersion), the 
debt-to-equity ratio (Leverage), and capital expenditure (CapitalExpenditure). I also 
include RetVolatility to control for executives’ overall risk-taking behaviors and contagion 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14 I also consider the total accruals in my analysis and define it as the absolute value of TAccruals scaled by 





variable CEOCtgMBAF (CFOCtgMBAF) to capture the reporting behaviors of a CEO’s 
(CFO’s) social connections as reflected in meeting analyst forecast benchmark. Finally, I 
include year and industry fixed effects and cluster standard errors at firm level.  
I present the test results in Table 5.2. Columns one through three present the results 
using Degree centrality measure and Columns four through six present the results using 
Eigenvector centrality measure. To distinguish the influence exerted by CEO and CFO 
centrality on meeting and just beating analyst forecasts, I include CEO centrality and CFO 
centrality in the model individually and jointly. The results in both individual analysis and 
joint analysis indicate that CEOs and CFOs with higher network centrality are more likely 
to engage in earnings manipulation in the form of meeting earnings benchmark, while the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimate on CFO centrality is greater than that on CEO 
centrality. I find that the coefficients on LogCEODegree and LogCFODegree are 
statistically different from each other in the joint analysis when I conduct F-test to compare 
the equality of the two coefficient estimates (P-value<0.10). To further assess the impact of 
executive centrality on the tendency to meet analyst benchmark, I compute the marginal 
effects and find that a one standard deviation increase in LogCEODegree 
(LogCEOEigenvector) increases the probability of MBAF by 1.40 (1.26) percent points, 
which is 4.39% (3.94%) of the mean probability of 32%. 15 I also find that a one standard 
deviation increase in LogCFODegree (LogCFOEigenvector) increases the probability of 
MBAF by 1.99 (1.96) percent points, which is 6.22% (6.13%) of the mean probability of 
32%.16 Therefore, the results in Table 5.2 suggest that both CEO and CFO centrality are 
positively related to the tendency to meet analyst benchmark and that CFO centrality has 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15 1.40 percent points= 0.013 (marginal effect) *1.075 (standard deviation of LogCEODegree);  
1.26 percent points = 0.005 (marginal effect) * 2.522 (standard deviation of LogCEOEigen). 
16 1.99 percent points= 0.018 (marginal effect) *1.108 (standard deviation of LogCFODegree);  





greater importance than CEO centrality. 17 
 
5.1.1.3 Financial Restatements
To test whether CEO (CFO) centrality is related to the likelihood of financial 
restatement, I run a logistic model wherein the dependent variable Restatement takes the 
value of one if a firm experiences a financial restatement and zero otherwise.18 
 
??????????? ? ????????????????????? ? ????????????????? ? ?????? ? ??????
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I include in the analysis several firm attributes that might influence the likelihood of 
restatement (i.e., firm size, growth, performance, age, leverage, and risk taking) and 
contagion variables that capture the influence from a CEO’s (CFO’s) social connections. 
The test results are summarized in Table 5.3. The results in individual analysis suggest that 
across Degree and Eigenvector centrality measures, CFO centrality is positively related to a 
firm’s tendency to issue financial statements that are subsequently restated. There is no 
evidence of a significant relation between CEO centrality and the likelihood of financial 
restatement, however. The same results hold when I jointly include CEO centrality and 
CFO centrality in the same regression, as shown in Columns three and six. F-test results 
also suggest that the coefficients on CEO centrality and CFO centrality in the joint analysis 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17?I recognize that the results in this section should be interpreted with caution as meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts could arise from either earnings manipulation or downward guided analyst forecasts 
(Matsumoto 2002).?
18?I also employ AAERs as an alternative measure of accounting irregularities. A benefit of the AAER sample 
is that it is likely to have a lower Type I error than samples that infer misreporting from earnings-based 
measures such as accruals. However, the AAER sample could lead to a higher Type II error rate because 
many misreporting firms might be undetected due to the SEC’s limited resources (Dechow et al. 2010). I 
define an indicator variable AAER which equals to one if a firm experiences an AAER and zero otherwise. 






are statistically different from each other (P-value<0.001). To evaluate the economic 
significance, I compute the marginal effects and find that a one standard deviation increase 
in LogCFODegree (LogCFOEigenvector) increases the probability of financial restatement 
by 0.78 (0.73) percent points. 19  This is economically significant as it represents 39% 
(36.5%) of the mean probability of 2%. ?
In summary, the results in this section are consistent with my prediction. 
Specifically, well-connected CEOs are more likely to engage in financial misreporting, as 
evidenced in a firm’s accrual management and the tendency to meet or beat earnings 
benchmark; well-connected CFOs are more likely to engage in financial misreporting as 
measured by all of the three reporting variables. In addition, the results suggest that the role 
of CFO network centrality dominates that of CEO network centrality in corporate reporting 
practices. This is consistent with the argument that CFOs are directly responsible for 
corporate financial reporting and therefore, CFOs could play a stronger role than CEOs in 
financial reporting (e.g., Geiger and North 2006; Jiang et al. 2010).  
 
5.1.2 Robustness Tests 
The main results above suggest that executive network centrality is positively 
related to corporate misreporting, consistent with my prediction. However, there are 
possible alternative explanations of the positive relation between executive network 
centrality and misreporting. For example, it is possible that well-connected CEOs and 
CFOs prefer to sit on firms that they anticipate to misreport, as they could enjoy the 
benefits of misreporting with implicit labor market insurance. If so, the positive relation 
may simply reflect the preference of well-connected managers for misreporting firms. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 0.78 percent points= 0.007 (marginal effect) *1.108 (standard deviation of LogCFODegree);  





Faleye (2007) and Faleye et al. (2014) address this type of endogeneity concern by 
regressing the dependent variable on lagged values of the explanatory variable. Following 
their approach, I regress financial reporting variables three years in the future on CEO 
(CFO) centrality in the current year while ensuring the same CEO (CFO) remains in 
position during both years. A positive relation between centrality in year t and misreporting 
in year t+3 would suggest that my results are not due to reverse causality. Table 5.4 
contains the test results. As the first two columns suggest, there is still a positive relation 
between CEO (CFO) centrality and future accrual management. The middle two columns 
show that CFO centrality is positively related to the likelihood of meeting earnings 
benchmark and the last two columns suggest that CFO centrality is positively associated 
with the likelihood of financial restatements. Overall, the results in Table 5.4 are still 
consistent with the idea that executives centrally positioned in the network, especially 
CFOs, are more likely to misreport. Therefore, the reverse causality concern described 
above does not explain my main findings. 
I also recognize that manager-fixed effects might influence managers’ reporting 
decisions. Therefore, I add executive-specific variables including age and gender into my 
analysis for a reduced sample. I repeat my main analysis by including these additional 
variables into the regressions and present the results in Table 5.5. The results suggest that 
CEO centrality is positively associated with accrual management and the likelihood to meet 
analyst benchmark and that CFO centrality is positively related to all the three reporting 
variables, consistent with my main findings. 20  Finally, the coefficient estimates on 
executive characteristics suggest that old executives and female executives are less likely to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20 I conduct all robustness analysis by including CEO and CFO centrality separately and jointly in the 
regressions. For brevity, I report the results of the joint regressions only. The untabulated results are 





engage in financial misreporting, consistent with the findings in prior studies (e.g., Bamber 
et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2012). 21 
I next consider controlling for the role of equity incentive in financial reporting. 
Prior studies have provided evidence that equity compensation provides incentives for 
managers to engage in financial misreporting. 22  Following Armstrong et al. (2013), I 
include both portfolio delta (pay-performance sensitivity) and portfolio vega (risk-taking 
incentives) in my analysis for a reduced sample. The definitions of portfolio delta and vega 
follow those in Core and Guay (2002) and the estimation process follows those in Coles et 
al. (2006) using ExecuComp data.23 The results are presented in Table 5.6. Consistent with 
my main findings, CEO centrality is positively related to accrual management and the 
tendency to meet earnings benchmark and CFO centrality is positively relate to all the three 
reporting variables. In addition, there is evidence that CFO equity incentives play a stronger 
role in financial misreporting than CEO equity incentives, consistent with the findings in 
Jiang et al. (2010).  
As a further test of the robustness of my results, I employ several alternative 
measures of executive centrality to assure that my results are not dependent on the specific 
measures utilized in my main tests. First, in this paper I focus on managers’ social 
connections outside their current firms to isolate the effect of within-firm connections 
because prior studies have documented the role of within-firm connections on corporate 
reporting choices (e.g., Chidambaran et al. 2012; Hwang and Kim 2012; Khanna et al. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21 For example, Bamber et al. (2010) find that female  managers tend to adopt disclosure styles that are less 
precise and underestimate earnings, consistent with females being more risk averse than males. Huang et al. 
(2012) find that CEO age is negatively associated with firms meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts and 
financial restatements. 
22 The empirical results on the relation between equity incentives and misreporting have been mixed. See 
Armstrong et al. (2013) for a summary of the various research design and results in the literature.  
23 I obtained the values of Delta and Vega from Professor Lalitha Naveen’s website, where she makes the 





2014). As a robustness check, I build executive social network by considering all 
connections a manager has - both outside the firm and within the firm for which I am 
measuring financial reporting choices. I calculate centrality measures based on this 
alternative network and rerun all the analysis. The results are consistent with my main 
findings. I summarize the summary statistics, correlation matrices, and main regression 
results in Appendix B. 
Second, in the main analysis, I build executive network centrality based on their 
employment and education experience. As the SEC requires companies to disclose 
executive and director employment information but not educational information, the 
information quality of employment data should be relatively higher than that of education. 
Therefore, in the additional analysis, I define two individuals as socially connected if they 
are linked through current or past employment only. I rerun all the tests using the 
employment-based centrality measures. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar to 
what I have found in Tables 5.1 through 5.6.  
Another concern about my centrality measure is that I regard two individuals as 
connected in all future years once a connection is established between them, which implies 
that the number of executives in the annual network increases monotonically over my 
sample period. For instance, there are 124,586 executives in the network of year 2000, and 
there are 176,580 executives in the network of year 2012. To address the concern that the 
network size might influence the results, I scale my centrality measures by the number of 
individuals in the corresponding annual network and re-estimate all the regressions. The 
untabulated results are consistent with my main findings. 24 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24 In this paper, I focus on managers’ social connections outside their current firms to isolate the effect of 
within-firm connections because prior studies have documented the role of within-firm connections on 
corporate reporting choices (e.g., Chidambaran et al. 2012; Hwang and Kim 2012; Khanna et al. 2014). As a 





5.1.3 Executive Centrality and Unintentional Restatements 
 In the main analysis, I test whether executive centrality is related to the likelihood 
of intentional financial restatements. This analysis provides evidence related to whether 
well-connected managers are less concerned about managerial labor market penalties than 
other managers. I also examine whether executive centrality is related to unintentional 
financial restatements. I hypothesize that well-connected managers have fewer career 
concerns than their less-connected peers and therefore, they might be more careless in 
corporate reporting practices than others. I obtain the unintentional restatement data from 
Audit Analytics database. Specifically, in the analysis, I include all restatements reported 
within Audit Analytics, excluding those classified under financial fraud or SEC 
investigation.  
 I estimate regression Model (3) with dependent variable RestateError equaling one 
if a firm experiences unintentional restatements. The results are presented in Table 5.7. As I 
expect, there is a positive relation between executive centrality and the likelihood of 
unintentional restatement. The positive relation holds for both CEOs and CFOs. The 
findings suggest that well-connected managers are less worried about the discipline 
mechanisms from the managerial labor market and thus are less rigorous in corporate 
reporting process than their less-connected peers.  
 
5.1.4 The Relative Centrality between CEO and CFO 
 In this section, I examine whether the relation between executive centrality and 
misreporting varies with the relative centrality between a firm’s CEO and its CFO. Network 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both outside the firm and within the firm for which I am measuring financial reporting choices. I calculate 
centrality measures based on this alternative network and rerun all the analysis. The results are consistent with 





centrality can be viewed as a power and status and thus, those who are more centrally 
positioned in a network are more influential than other individuals. Therefore, it is possible 
that the relative centrality between a firm’s CEO and CFO matters in corporate reporting 
decisions. Specifically, if a CEO’s (CFO’s) centrality is significantly higher than her CFO 
(CEO), then the CEO (CFO) might play a more important role than her CFO (CEO) in 
corporate reporting. To test the role of relative centrality, I define an indicator variable 
CEOHighDegree (CEOHighEigen) that equals one if the value of CEODegree 
(CEOEigenvector) is greater than three times that of CFODegree (CFOEigenvector). I 
define CFOHighDegree (CFOHighEigen) as an indicator variable that equals one if the 
value of CEODegree (CEOEigenvector) is smaller than that of CFODegree 
(CFOEigenvector). Since the mean and median values of CEO centrality are significantly 
higher than that of CFO centrality, the measures of relative centrality are not defined in a 
symmetric manner.25 I include the two indicator variables in the analysis and present the 
results in Table 5.8. I find that my main findings still hold after considering the relative 
centrality between CEOs and CFOs. Moreover, there is no evidence that the relative 
centrality between CEO and CFO is associated with accrual management and the tendency 
to meet analyst benchmark. Although there is some evidence that the relative centrality has 
a positive relation with the likelihood of financial restatement, the results hold only when I 
use Degree as the centrality measure. Overall, the results in this section show no evidence 
that relative centrality between CEO and CFO is related to reporting choices made by well-
connected managers. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25?The cutoff values to compare relative centrality are defined based on the mean and median values of CEO 
and CFO centrality. The mean and median values of CEO Degree centrality are around 1.5 times of CFO 
Degree centrality. The mean and median values of CEO Eigenvector centrality are around 2 times that of CFO 
Eigenvector centrality. Therefore, I view a CEO as having high centrality relative to her CFO if the CEO’s 
centrality is more than 3 times her CFO’s centrality; I view a CFO as having high centrality relative to her 
CEO if the CFO’s centrality is greater than her CEO’s centrality. My results are qualitatively similar when I 





5.1.5 The Effect of Corporate Governance 
Having identified a relation between financial misreporting and executive network 
centrality, I test whether the standard governance mechanism helps to mitigate this issue. 
Accounting research has documented the power of corporate governance to limit managers’ 
adverse actions in corporate reporting (Bushman and Smith 2001). Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to study whether the relation between executive network centrality and 
misreporting is weaker in well-governed firms. I measure governance effectiveness by the 
proportion of independent outside board members. Outside directors are viewed as a key 
governance factor and help to mitigate managers’ strategic financial reporting behavior 
(McVay et al. 2006). I define IndepBoard as an indicator variable that equals one if there is 
greater than 75% independent board members and zero otherwise. I determine the cutoff 
value of the governance variable based on its sample median.  
To test the effect of corporate governance, I include the governance variable and its 
interaction with CEO (CFO) centrality in the regression, in addition to firm characteristics 
included in the main analysis. Table 5.9 summarizes the regression results. The first two 
columns of Table 5.9 report the governance effect on the relation between executive 
centrality and accrual management. The coefficient estimates on CEO and CFO centrality 
remain significant and those on the interaction items show no evidence that the governance 
mechanism in the form of a high percentage of independent board members mitigates the 
occurrence of misreporting associated with executive centrality. The middle two columns 
present the results for the tendency to meet analyst earnings benchmark. The coefficient 
estimates on CEO and CFO centrality remain significantly positive and the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction items suggest that a high percentage of outside board members 





meet analyst benchmarks. The last two columns contain the results for the likelihood of 
financial restatements. There is still a significantly positive relation between CFO centrality 
and the likelihood of financial restatements after taking into account standard governance, 
although the interaction item of CEO centrality and governance variable is significantly and 
negatively associated with the likelihood of restatement. Overall, the results in Table 5.9 
still suggest a significantly positive relation between executive centrality, especially CFO 
centrality, and financial misreporting. This indicates that standard governance in the form 
of a high percentage of independent directors can - at best - partially mitigate the positive 
relation between executive centrality and financial misreporting. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 – Labor Market Outcomes 
In the above analyses, I examine the relation between executive network centrality 
and corporate reporting choices. The results suggest a positive relation between top 
executive centrality and the occurrence of corporate misreporting, especially for CFOs. In 
this section, I examine labor market consequences as a mechanism that links executive 
centrality and corporate misreporting. CEOs and CFOs weigh the expected costs and 
benefits in making corporate decisions. If they decide to misreport, one of the greatest 
personal costs upon the revealing of misreporting is the penalty from the managerial labor 
market.  However, well-connected CEOs and CFOs are less concerned about the ex post 
penalties because their personal connections can reduce the expected costs associated with 
misreporting by providing implicit labor market insurance. Therefore, labor market 
consequences are likely to serve as a link between executive centrality and the occurrence 






5.2.1 Executive Turnover 
To evaluate the labor market outcomes, I start the analysis by exploring whether the 
likelihood of CEO (CFO) turnover varies with the level of social connectedness when 
financial misreporting is revealed. For a sample of firms experiencing financial 
restatements, I conduct the turnover analysis for CEOs and CFOs separately to distinguish 
the labor market consequences on CEOs and CFOs.26 I estimate the following logistic 
models for a subsample of firm-year observations experiencing financial restatements 
(Model 5.4 for CEO turnover and Model 5.5 for CFO turnover): 
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The dependent variable CEOTurnover (CFOTurnover) is an indicator variable that 
equals one if there is a CEO (CFO) turnover within a two-year window following the firm’s 
first filing of a restatement and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is my 
centrality measure as defined previously, which shows the incremental effect of network 
centrality on executive turnover. I control for firm size, firm performance, executive age, 
and executive gender in the analysis.   
The results for CEO and CFO turnover are presented in Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 5.10, respectively. After merging restatement sample with control variables, there are 
157 firm-year observations in the sample to test CEO turnover and 158 firm-year 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26  Although the previous analysis does not show a significant relation between CEO centrality and the 






observations in the sample to test CFO turnover. In Panel A, I sort the CEO sample into 
observations with CEO turnover and those without, and compare the mean and median 
values of CEO centrality across the two subsamples. The univariate analysis suggests that 
CEOs that depart their current employers have significantly lower network centrality than 
those remain at their current firms. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the regression 
analysis suggests a negative relation between the likelihood of CEO turnover and CEO 
network centrality. The results in Panel A are consistent with findings in prior studies that 
well-connected CEOs are less likely to be affected by the managerial labor market (e.g., El-
Khatib et al. 2014). The coefficient estimates on control variables suggest that CEOs whose 
firms experience poorer performance are more likely to leave their current employers than 
those CEOs whose firms experience better performance, consistent with the findings in 
prior studies that firm performance is an important factor in CEO turnover (e.g., Liu 2010). 
I conduct similar analyses to examine CFO turnover for a sample of firms 
experiencing financial restatements. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5.10. The 
comparison of mean and median values of CFO centrality based on the values of 
CFOTurnover suggests that CFOs that depart their current employers have significantly 
higher network centrality than those remain at their current firms. The regression analysis 
also suggests a positive relation between the likelihood of CFO turnover and CFO network 
centrality. The results suggest that well-connected CFOs are more likely to leave their 
current firms after their firms experience financial restatements. The different results on 
CEO turnover and CFO turnover as a consequence of financial restatement could be due to 
their different responsibilities. CEOs are responsible for their firms’ overall success and 
failure and thus firm performance tends to be an important factor in terms of CEO turnover. 





the parties directly responsible for their firms’ misreporting. When their internal reputation 
is damaged, well-connected CFOs are more likely to leave their current firms as they have 
more alternative job opportunities compared to their less-connected peers. Thus, they are 
more likely to leave their current employers when their firms restate financial statements.   
 
5.2.2 Subsequent Reemployment  
To directly examine whether well-connected managers have favorable labor market 
outcomes than less-connected others, I next test whether social connections facilitate 
CEOs’ and CFOs’ re-entry into the labor market following their departure from their 
current employers, as predicted in my second hypothesis. For a sample of CEOs (CFOs) 
departing their current firms following financial restatements, I run the below logistic 
regressions where the dependent variable CEOEmploy (CFOEmploy) equals one if the 
departing CEO (CFO) obtains a similar level of position as an executive or director at 
another publicly traded U.S. firms within a four-year time period following the first filing 
of the restatement (Model 5.6 for CEO reemployment and Model 5.7 for CFO 
reemployment). 
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In the analysis, I control for firm characteristics of the prior firm a CEO (CFO) 
works for (i.e., firm size and firm performance) and the CEO’s (CFO’s) characteristics (i.e., 
age and gender). A significantly positive coefficient estimate on the centrality measure 
would suggest that a well-connected manager is more likely to find alternative jobs when 





connected managers are less constrained by the external managerial labor market relative to 
otherwise comparable others. 
I present the results for CEO reemployment in Panel A of Table 5.11, and those for 
CFO reemployment in Panel B of Table 5.11. My final sample to test CEO reemployment 
contains 82 firm-year observations and that to test CFO reemployment contains 75 firm-
year observations. In Panel A, I start by separating the full sample based on whether a CEO 
finds a comparable job within a four-year window following the restatement, and compare 
the mean and median values of CEO centrality across the two subsamples. Univariate 
analysis shows no evidence of a significant difference in network centrality between those 
CEOs who find comparable jobs and those otherwise. When I use regression model (5.1) to 
test whether there is a positive relation between CEO network centrality and the likelihood 
to find a comparable job after a CEO leaves the current firm, I do not find a significant 
relation neither.  
In Panel B of Table 5.11, I conduct similar analyses to examine CFO reemployment 
after they depart restating firms. When I compare the centrality values of CFOs who find 
comparable jobs within a four-year window following the restatement with those otherwise, 
I find that those CFOs who find alternative jobs have significantly higher network 
centrality than those who fail to find alternative positions. The regression results further 
show that those CFOs with higher network centrality are more likely to find comparable 
jobs within a four-year window following their firms’ restatements. I compute the marginal 
effects to assess the impact of executive centrality on the likelihood of reemployment. The 
results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in LogCFODegree 





(10.37) percent points, which are economically significant. 27  The findings for CFOs’ 
employment prospects are consistent with my second hypothesis. That is, well-connected 
CFOs are more likely to find alternative jobs after their firms’ misreporting is detected than 
less-connected CFOs.  
Collectively, the results in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 suggest that well-connected 
CFOs are more likely to leave their current firms when their current firms restate financial 
statements and that after their departure, they are more likely to find alternative jobs than 
their less-connected peers. In contrast, the results also suggest that well-connected CEOs 
are less likely to leave their current firms when their firms experience restatements. For 
those CEOs who do leave their current employers after financial restatements, there is no 
significant difference between well-connected CEOs and their less-connected peers in their 
subsequent reemployment prospects. These findings indicate that CFOs are directly 
responsible for financial reporting and that well-connected CFOs have favorable 
employment outcomes in the managerial labor market. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27 10.97 percent points= 0.102 (marginal effect) *1.076 (standard deviation of LogCFODegree);  






Tests of the Relation between Accruals and CEO/CFO Network Centrality 
?
 Dependent Variable = ?DAccruals? 





   




   
























































































































Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 
R2 48.03% 50.16% 53.32% 47.88% 49.77% 52.97% 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the relation between accrual 
management and executive network centrality. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, 









Tests of the Relation between MBAF and CEO/CFO Network Centrality 
?
? Dependent Variable =MBAF 




(4.91)    
LogCFODegree  0.446*** (9.64) 
0.321*** 
(7.19)    
LogCEOEigenvector 




































































































































Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 
Pseudo R2 47.34% 56.56% 66.70% 47.25% 56.28% 66.66% 
Notes: This table reports the logistic regression results for the relation between a firm’s 
tendency to meet or beat earnings target and executive centrality. See Appendix A for 
variable definition. The first three columns use Degree as the centrality measure, while the 
last three columns use Eigenvector as the centrality measure. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 








Tests of the Relation between Restatements and CEO/CFO Network Centrality 
 
 Dependent Variable = Restatement 




(-0.45)    
LogCFODegree  0.399*** (7.24) 
0.400*** 
(7.05)    
LogCEOEigenvector    0.036 (1.38)  
10.038 
(-1.31) 







































































































Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 
R2 14.72% 16.59% 17.00% 14.72% 16.08% 16.57% 
Notes: This table reports the logistic regression results for the relation between a firm’s 
likelihood to experience financial restatements and executive centrality. See Appendix A for 
variable definition.  Robust z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 









Robustness Test - Do Well-connected Managers Prefer Misreporting Firms 
 
Dependent Variables = ?
?DAccruals?? MBAF? Restatement?







































































































































    


















Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 12,071 12,071 12,071 12,071 12,071 12,071 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 39.05% 38.87% 4.49% 4.46% 17.76% 17.28% 
Notes: This table reports the results for regressions of 3-year-ahead reporting variables on 
executive centrality at current year. See Appendix A for variable definition. Robust t-values 
or z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. 






Robustness Test - Controlling for Executive Characteristics 
?
Dependent Variables =  
? ?DAccruals? MBAF Restatement 



































































NumAnalyst   0.033*** (3.00) 
0.033*** 
(2.98)   
AnalystDispersion   -0.214*** (-2.74) 
-0.174** 




















































(12.81)     
CEOCtgMBAF   3.263*** (18.58) 
3.305*** 
(19.14)   
CFOCtgMBAF   4.424*** (24.72) 
4.420*** 
(25.77)   
CEOCtgREST     1.084** (2.26) 
1.215** 
(2.50) 


























































Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 9,568 9,568 9,568 9,568 9,568 9,568 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 56.47% 56.18% 66.93% 66.94% 21.44% 20.88% 
Notes: This table presents the results of robustness check by additional controls for 
executive characteristics. See Appendix A for variable definition. Robust t-values or z-
values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote 









Robustness Test - Controlling for Executive Equity Incentives 
?
Dependent Variables =  
?DAccruals? MBAF Restatement 



































































NumAnalyst   0.044** (2.11) 
0.044** 
(2.10)   
AnalystDispersion   -0.141 (-0.67) 
-0.114 




















































(11.54)     
CEOCtgMBAF   3.902*** (16.30) 
3.951*** 
(16.05)   
CFOCtgMBAF   5.480*** (15.75) 
5.364*** 
(16.75)   
CEOCtgREST     -0.744 (-0.80) 
-0.440 
(-0.48) 



























































Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 4,359 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 58.75% 58.37% 67.89% 67.36% 11.20% 11.39% 
Notes: This table presents the results of robustness check by additional controls for 
executive equity incentives. See Appendix A for variable definition. Robust t-values or z-
values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote 









Unintentional Restatements and CEO/CFO Network Centrality 
 
 Dependent Variables = RestateError  





LogCEOEigenvector  0.023** (1.97) 





































Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 18,757 18,757 
R2 8.72% 8.92% 
Notes: This table reports the logistic regression results for the relation between a firm’s 
likelihood to experience unintentional financial restatements and executive centrality. See 
Appendix A for variable definition. Robust z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 









Relative Centrality between CEO and CFO 
?
Dependent Variables =  
?DAccruals? MBAF Restatement 



































































NumAnalyst   0.022** (2.46) 
0.022** 
(2.42)   
AnalystDispersion   -0.185** (-2.02) 
-0.174** 




















































(15.75)     
CEOCtgMBAF   3.366*** (28.13) 
3.396*** 
(28.85)   
CFOCtgMBAF   4.332*** (34.15) 
4.322*** 
(35.58)   
CEOCtgREST     1.380*** (4.18) 
1.332*** 
(3.91) 





























Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 53.32% 52.98% 66.70% 66.66% 17.39% 16.60% 
Notes: This table presents the results of relative centrality analysis. See Appendix A for 
variable definition. Robust t-values or z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 












The Effect of Corporate Governance 
 
Dependent Variables = 
 ?DAccruals? MBAF Restatement 
























































































































































































    2.507*** (5.07) 
2.468*** 
(5.06) 
Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 18,161 18,161 18,161 18,161 18,161 18,161 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 53.64% 53.27% 67.09% 66.98% 20.19% 19.25% 
Notes: This table summarizes the regression results for the relation between executive 
centrality and corporate reporting considering standard governance mechanism. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-values or z-values (in parentheses) are based 
on standard errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  








Labor Market Consequences - Executive Turnover 
 
Panel A: CEO turnover and network centrality 
A1: CEO turnover vs. Non-CEO turnover subsamples 
 CEOTurnover=1 (N=101) CEOTurnover=0 (N=56) Differences 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
CEODegree 88.62 52.00 137.37 166.98 84.50 205.34 -78.36** -32.50*** 
CEOEigenvector 0.0101 0.0001 0.0865 0.0257 0.0003 0.1117 -0.0156 -0.0252* 
 
A2: Regression of CEO turnover 
 Dependent Variable = CEOTurnover 
LogCEODegree -0.823*** (-3.47)  
LogCEOEigenvector  -0.163** (-1.99) 
SIZE 0.142 (1.12) 
-0.030 
(-0.27) 
ROA -5.461** (-2.17) 
-4.091* 
(-1.79) 
CEOAge -4.511*** (-3.13) 
-4.041*** 
(-2.93) 
CEOGender 1.852 (1.63) 
1.864*** 
(2.83) 
No. Obs. 157 157 












Panel B: CFO turnover and network centrality 
B1: CFO turnover vs. Non-CFO turnover subsamples 
 CFOTurnover=1 (N=102) CFOTurnover=0 (N=56) Differences 
 Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
CFODegree 142.48 71.00 175.32 75.45 29.50 146.10 67.03*** 41.50*** 
CFOEigenvector 0.0150 0.0003 0.0833 0.0166 0.0001 0.1162 -0.0016 0.0002*** 
B2: Regression of CFO turnover 
 Dependent Variable = CFOTurnover 
LogCFODegree 0.644*** (2.96)      
LogCFOEigenvector    0.153* (1.86) 
SIZE 0.039 (0.30) 
0.152 
(1.26) 
ROA 0.369 (0.24) 
-0.105 
(-0.07) 
CFOAge 4.241*** (3.19) 
3.910*** 
(3.05) 
CFOGender -1.276 (-1.58) 
-1.448 
(-1.85)* 
No. Obs. 158 158 
13.15% Pseudo R2  16.10% 
Notes: This table summarizes the analysis for the relation between executive centrality and 
executive turnover following financial restatements. Panel A presents the results for CEO 
turnover and Panel B presents the results for CFO turnover. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, 








Labor Market Consequences - Subsequent Reemployment 
 
Panel A: CEO reemployment and network centrality 
A1: CFO reemployment vs. Non- CFO reemployment subsamples 
 CEOEmploy =1 (N=58) C EOEmploy =0 (N=24) Differences 




Dev. Mean Median 
CEODegree 99.12 57.00 168.35 91.17 50.00 89.17 7.95 7.00 
CEOEigenvector 0.0165 0.0002 0.1141 0.0021 0.0002 0.0042 0.0144 0.1139 
 
A2: Regression of CEO reemployment 
 Dependent Variable = CEOEmploy 
LogCEODegree -0.396 (-1.29)  
LogCEOEigenvector  -0.037 (-0.32) 
SIZE 0.348* (1.86) 
0.248 
(1.42) 
ROA 1.718 (1.27) 
1.921 
(1.42) 
CEOAge -0.058 (-1.40) 
-0.053 
(-1.27) 
CEOGender 0.223 (1.17) 
0.236 
(1.23) 
No. Obs. 82 82 











Panel B: CFO reemployment and network centrality 
B1: CFO reemployment vs. Non- CFO reemployment subsamples 
 CFOEmploy=1 (N=52) CFOEmploy =0 (N=23) Differences 
 Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median
CFODegree 191.62 105.50 219.64 81.09 51.00 67.67 110.53*** 54.50** 
CFOEigenvector 0.0282 0.0011 0.1156 0.0010 0.0002 0.0022 0.0272* 0.0009** 
B2: Regression of CFO reemployment 
 Dependent Variable = CFOEmploy 
LogCFODegree 0.542* (1.72)  
LogCFOEigenvector  0.220* (1.73) 
SIZE 0.218 (1.16) 
0.258 
(1.44) 
ROA 2.261 (0.86) 
2.293 
(0.90) 
CFOAge -0.006 (-0.17) 
-0.015 
(-0.42) 
CFOGender 0.283 (0.86) 
0.325 
(0.99) 
No. Obs. 75 75 
Pseudo R2  10.63% 10.85% 
Notes: This table summarizes the analysis for the relation between executive centrality and 
the subsequent reemployment of managers who depart their current firms following 
financial restatements. Panel A presents the results for CEO reemployment and Panel B 
presents the results for CFO reemployment. See Appendix A for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote 









I note several caveats related to this study that need to be addressed in future 
research. First, the results in this study show that more central CEOs and CFOs are more 
likely to engage in financial misreporting than others. My sample in the study tends to 
include large public firms, however. It is unclear whether the results can be generalized to 
small firms.28 In future work, I plan to supplement my current sample with small size firms 
and examine whether there are variations across firms of different sizes.  
Second, the sample sizes in the analysis to examine the labor market consequences 
are small since my initial sample starts from observations experiencing intentional 
restatements in Audit Analysis database. The sample sizes are further reduced when I rely 
on BoardEx data to identify executive turnover and subsequent reemployment. That might 
affect the statistical power of the analysis. In future research, I will supplement the current 
restatement data with accounting irregularities from other data sources to enlarge the 
sample size. I also plan to manually collect data from corporate filings along with media 
sources such as Wall Street Journal articles to supplement BoardEx data in identifying 
executive turnover and reemployment.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
28 The correlation coefficients in Table 4.2 show that large firms tend to have more central CEOs and CFOs 
than small firms. It is possible that for small firms with less central CEOs and CFOs, increase in their network 





Finally, managerial quality could be correlated with executive centrality and thus 
serve as a potential alternative explanation of my findings. An able executive has more 
opportunities to serve as an outside director and to work for a new employer, which in turn 
increases her centrality. Executive quality is unobservable and hard to quantify, however. 
Those studies that do examine the relation between managerial quality and earnings quality 
reach inconsistent conclusions using different measures. For instance, using press coverage 
as a measure of managerial reputation, Francis et al. (2008) find a negative association 
between CEOs’ reputations. In contrast, Demerjian et al. (2013) find that more able 
managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements and higher earnings quality 
then other managers, using managerial ability score based on managers’ efficiency in 
transforming corporate resources to revenues. Moreover, existing measures of managerial 
ability and power tend to focus on CEOs (e.g., Francis et al. 2008; Demerjian et al. 2012), 
while no study has directly measure CFO quality. This makes it very challenging to address 
executive ability as an alternative explanation in this study as I focus on both CEOs and 
CFOs. Therefore, future research needs to consider how to effectively quantify CEO and 









Using network centrality measures built from executives’ employment and 
education background, this study investigates the informational role of executives’ personal 
social connections on corporate reporting choices. The main results suggest that executive 
social network position exerts significant influence on corporate reporting choices. 
Specifically, well-connected CEOs and CFOs are associated with a higher occurrence of 
financial misreporting, with CFOs having greater impact then CEOs. The results are robust 
to several robustness checks. Additional analysis suggests that standard corporate 
governance is only able to exert limited monitoring role on well-connected CEOs and 
CFOs in corporate reporting practices.  
I also examine labor market consequences as a channel through which the link 
between executive centrality and corporate reporting choices holds. Specifically, I examine 
whether executive network centrality is related to executive turnover and the subsequent 
reemployment prospects following employment termination at a current job when the 
financial misreporting is revealed. The results suggest that well-connected CFOs are more 
likely to leave their current employers when their wrongdoings are revealed and that their 
subsequent reemployment rate is higher than their less-connected peers. In contrast, the 
analysis on labor market consequences shows no evidence that the level of CEO 





financial restatements are revealed. 
Collectively, the results in this paper suggest that well-connected CFOs are less 
concerned about the ex post penalties from the managerial labor market because their social 
connections enhance their employment outcomes when their wrongdoings are detected. 
Therefore, well-connected CFOs are more likely to engage in financial misreporting. The 
findings on the significant role of CFO network centrality on misreporting are consistent 
with social science studies that interpret positional centrality as a source of social power 
and status (e.g., Mizruchi and Potts 1998) and that the monitoring role of the board 
diminishes with top executives’ power (Admas et al. 2005). 
This study complements prior studies that examine the role of human factors in 
corporate reporting by focusing on the relations a manager develops with other business 
leaders. The focus on a CEO’s (CFO’s) connectedness with other executives and directors 
outside of her current firms distinguishes this study from related studies that focus on social 
ties within a firm’s boardroom (e.g., Chidambaran et al. 2012; Hwang and Kim 2012; 
Khanna et al. 2014). The findings in this study imply that although there are potential 
benefits associated with executive personal connections as suggested in prior studies (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2008; Fracassi 2014; Faleye et al. 2014), there are also magnifying agency 
problems in financial reporting associated with well-connected executives. The standard 
governance mechanism seems to have a limited role in mitigating this agency problem. 
More importantly, the findings indicate the substantial influence of CFOs in corporate 
reporting choice and suggest that there might be circumstances under which CFOs are 
related to financial misreporting and that they even dominate the risk from CEOs. The 






LogCEODegree The natural logarithm of the total number of executives or 
directors with whom a CEO shares a common employment or 
education link.  
??????? ? ????? ???? ), 
where ?ij equals one if there is a link between individual i and j 
and zero otherwise. 
LogCFODegree The natural logarithm of the total number of executives or 
directors with whom a CFO shares a common employment or 
education link. Degree is defined in the same way as above. 
LogCEOEigenvector The natural logarithm of a CEO’s Eigenvector centrality. It 
measures whether a CEO’s direct connections are well-connected 
as well. It is calculated as  
???????????? ? ??? ?
?
?
? ???? ???????????????, 
where ? is the proportionality factor and Aij is an adjacency 
matrix. 
LogCFOEigenvector The natural logarithm of a CFO’s Eigenvector centrality. 
Eigenvector is defined in the same way as above. 
?DAccruals? Discretionary accrual is measured as absolute value of the 


















where TAccruals is total accruals which equal the difference 
between net income and cash flow from operations; ASSET is the 
lagged total assets; ?SALES and ?AR are the change in sales and 
change in accounts receivables, respectively; PPE is the net 






MBAF An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s actual earnings 
per share is equal to or greater than the latest analyst consensus 
mean forecast by three cents or less, zero otherwise. 
Restatement An indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports accounting 
information that is later restated and considered as financial fraud 
or subject to SEC investigation, zero otherwise. 
RestateError An indicator variable that equals one if a firm unintentionally reports 
accounting information that is later restated (i.e., exclude those 
classified as financial fraud or subject to SEC investigation), zero 
otherwise. 
CEOTurnover An indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences a CEO 
turnover within a two-year window following the filing of a 
restatement, zero otherwise. 
CFOTurnover An indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences a CFO 
turnover within a two-year window following the filing of a 
restatement, zero otherwise. 
CEOEmploy An indicator variable that equals one if a departing CEO finds 
alternative  job within a four-year window following the filing of 
a restatement, and zero otherwise. 
CFOEmploy An indicator variable that equals one if a departing CFO finds 
alternative job within a four-year window following the filing of a 
restatement, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity (MVE), 
where MVE is the end-of-year price per share multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding at year-end. 
BTM A firm’s book value of equity scaled by its market value of equity. 
SalesGrowth A firm’s sales in year t divided by sales in year t-1. 
ROA A firm’s net income scaled by its total assets. 
Leverage A firm’s total liabilities scaled by its total assets. 
FirmAge The number of years that a firm appears on Compustat database. 
NumAnalyst Number of analysts that contribute to the forecast consensus. 
AnalystDispersion Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts contributing to the 
consensus divided by the median forecast. 
CapitalExpenditure A firm’s capital expenditure scaled by its total assets. 
RetVolatility The natural logarithm of standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock 
return during a fiscal year. 
CEOCtgDACC An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CEO’s 
social connections are from firms with ?DAccruals? higher than 
the mean ?DAccruals? for all firms in my sample period, zero 
otherwise. 
CFOCtgDACC An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CFO’s 
social connections are from firms with ?DAccruals? higher than 






CEOCtgMBAF An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CEO’s 
social connections are from firms that meet or just beat analyst 
earnings benchmark, zero otherwise. 
CFOCtgMBAF An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CFO’s 
social connections are from firms that meet or just beat analyst 
earnings benchmark, zero otherwise. 
CEOCtgREST An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CEO’s 
social connections are from firms that experience restatements, 
zero otherwise. 
CFOCtgREST An indicator variable that equals one if more than half of a CFO’s 
social connections are from firms that experience restatements, 
zero otherwise. 
CEOAge Age of a firm’s CEO. 
CFOAge Age of a firm’s CFO. 
CEOGender An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s CEO is female, 
zero otherwise. 
CFOGender An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s CFO is female, 
zero otherwise. 
LogCEODelta The natural logarithm of a CEO’s portfolio delta. Delta is defined 
as dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the 
firm’s stock price. 
LogCFODelta The natural logarithm of a CFO’s portfolio delta. Delta is defined 
in the same way as above. 
LogCEOVega The natural logarithm of a CEO’s portfolio vega. Vega is defined 
as dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 change in the 
standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. 
LogCFOVega The natural logarithm of a CFO’s portfolio vega. Vega is defined 
in the same way as above. 
CEOHighDegree An indicator variable that equals one if the value of CEODegree is 
greater than three times that of CFODegree. 
CEOHighEigen An indicator variable that equals one if the value of 
CEOEigenvector is greater than three times that of 
CFOEigenvector. 
CFOHighDegree An indicator variable that equals one if the value of CEODegree is 
smaller than that of CFODegree. 
CFOHighEigen An indicator variable that equals one if the value of 
CEOEigenvector is smaller than that of CFOEigenvector. 
IndepBoard An indicator variable that equals one if the percentage of 







EXECUTIVE OVERALL CENTRALITY 
This appendix includes descriptive statistics, correlation metrics, and regression 
analysis for the full sample where a CEO’s (CFO’s) centrality is calculated in a network 
including both her within-firm connections and her connections outside her current firm. 
Table B1 includes the descriptive statistics for executive overall centrality. Table B2 
presents correlation metrics between overall centrality and main variables used in the 
regression analysis. Table B3 reports the regressions analysis of the relation between 




Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
?
 Mean P25 Median P75 Std. dev. 
Centrality Variables (N=19,069) 
CEODegree 155.68 32.00 72.00 169.00 219.27
CFODegree 122.96 28.00 57.00 120.00 186.96
CEOEigenvector 0.0081 0.0000 0.0002 0.0021 0.0527
CFOEigenvector 0.0022 0.0000 0.0001 0.0014 0.0057






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regression Analysis of Executive Overall Centrality and Misreporting 
 
 Dependent Variables = 
 ?DAccruals? MBAF Restatement 







































































































































    


















Year/Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 19,069 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 53.26% 52.99% 66.82% 66.75% 17.19% 16.78% 
Notes: This table reports the results for regressions of reporting variables on executive 
overall centrality. Robust t-values or z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at firm level. See Appendix A for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote 
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